

## MAIN OBJECTIVES AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT OF HUNGARIAN PARTIES ABROAD

NÓRA BARANYAI<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT** - The history and development of Hungarian communities living in the Carpathian Basin and the parties representing them is a significant topic for both Hungarian national politics and social science. Through the analysis of census and election databases, relevant party documents, and the mobilization index developed by Strijbis and Kotnarowski, this study also aims to contribute to expanding knowledge about Hungarian communities and parties abroad. The analysis covers the presentation of some basic, country-specific characteristics of Hungarian ethnic communities, and based on these, a brief overview of the individual community types and the parties representing them. Then, on the one hand, the study shows the main goals and place of Hungarian ethnoregional parties in the typology developed for Central and Eastern Europe based on the goals of political organizations. On the other hand, using time-series data the study examines the relationship between the major parties and the given Hungarian community in terms of electoral support at the national and regional levels. The presented results strengthen and consolidate the knowledge about the national and regional position, support of Hungarian ethnoregional parties, and illustrate the different aims, development paths of organizations and the dynamics of their support. However, the results are also suitable for drawing attention to trends due to the decline of communities, which also affects the chances and future of political organizations.

**Keywords:** Carpathian Basin, Hungarian communities, ethnoregional parties, typology, electoral support

### INTRODUCTION

The history and development of Hungarian ethnoregional parties have been closely monitored by scholars living in Hungary and in the respective countries since the regime change. The literature uses a number of different terms to refer to political organizations representing ethnic groups, although the range of parties defined by different authors often coincides: ethnic parties (Horowitz, 1985; Chandra – Metz, 2002; Chandra, 2011), regionalist parties (Urwin, 1985; Strmiska, 2003), peripheral parties (Rokkan – Urwin, 1982), ethnopolitical parties (Ishiyama – Breuning, 1998), and ethnoregionalist parties (De Winter, 1998; De Winter – Gomez-Reino, 2002; Dandoy, 2010) are all widespread forms. Salat –Székely (2018) concluded that the term “ethnic party” is most appropriate for parties operating in the Central and Eastern European region, primarily because of the sophistication and clarity of the definition. At the same time, the use of the term “ethnoregional party” is not unprecedented in the region; in fact, according to Szász (2006) and the definition criteria he established, the most Hungarian parties abroad at that time could be classified in this category. This study argues in favour of using the latter term, as it examines parties that represent geographically concentrated minority communities and demand some form of self-determination for these communities by changing the functioning of the nation-state and, in some cases, its democratic order (Müller-Rommel, 1998; De Winter, 2001).

The term “some form of self-determination” covers a wide range of concepts, with the parties’ goals ranging from cultural protectionism to separatism. Typologies based on this definition generally classify (mainly Western European) ethnoregional aspirations into cultural and territorial types, and within the territorial type, they distinguish between intra-state and cross-border aspirations (Snyder, 1982; Seiler, 1985; Rudolph – Thompson, 1989; Mikesell – Murphy, 1991; Bugajski, 1995; Keating,

---

<sup>1</sup> PhD, research fellow, ELTE CERS Institute for Regional Studies, 10 Liszt F.str. 9022 Győr, Hungary. E-mail address: baranyai.nora@krtk.elte.hu

1996; De Winter, 1998; Ishiyama – Breuning, 1998; Coackley, 2003; Wolff, 2004; Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro – De Winter – Lynch, 2006; Jenne, 2007; Dandoy, 2010; Nedelcu – DeBardeleben, 2016), with significant differences between categories and scholars' approaches, of course.

When examining the success of ethnic and ethnoregional parties, factors that differ from the general ones must be taken into account, as these parties can only count on the support of a part of society (some even question their definition as modern parties and their role in mitigating social conflicts – e.g. Gombár, 1994; Gunther–Diamond, 2003; Pap, 1999). Several authors have attempted to identify the factors that influence or hinder their success. According to various authors, these factors are as follows: the history of indigenous peoples, especially their experience of autonomy (Koev, 2019), the party's organization (Ishiyama – Stewart, 2019) and stable party leadership (Gherghina, 2014), as well as effective communication (Mudde, 2007), the size of the ethnic community (Chandra, 2005; Jigla – Gherghina, 2011), territorial concentration (Koev, 2014), proportional electoral systems (Lublin, 2014), territorial autonomy (Ishiyama, 2000, 2006; Brancati, 2007; De Winter, 1998) generally contribute to political success, while inter-ethnic party competition (Cox, 1987; Waller, 1995) generally leads to failure.

In general, comprehensive analysis of CEE political parties, as well as the ethnoregional communities and regions that form their social and territorial base, is still incomplete, although the number of case studies dealing with one or more selected cases has increased significantly (e.g. Dobos, 2013; Harrach, 2016; Kiss – Barna – Székely, 2018; Nedelcu – DeBardeleben, 2016; Stroschein, 2001; Zuber, 2011), and we increasingly see comparative and summarizing analyses of the functioning, behaviour, political role and success of relevant parties (e.g. Bernauer – Bochsler, 2011; Bochsler, 2006; 2011; Ishiyama – Stewart, 2021; Nakai, 2012; Koev, 2021; Kostadinova, 2007; Strijbis – Kotnarowski, 2015; Székely – Horváth, 2014; Szöcsik – Zuber, 2015; Zuber – Szöcsik, 2019). Although many scholars have analysed the success of Hungarian parties abroad (Bodó, 2017; Illyés – Székely, 2017; Kiss, 2009; Kiss – Barna – Székely, 2013, 2018; Székely, n.d.), in Slovakia (Harrach, 2016; 2017; Rákóczi, 2020; Ravasz, 2013) and Serbia (Léphaft, 2014; 2021), but there are only few analyses that examine these organizations operating in different countries and under different circumstances within a single study and based on the same criteria.

This study attempts to analyze Hungarian communities living in neighboring states and the Hungarian ethnoregional parties representing them from a common perspective, along the following themes and questions:

- 1) Where do Hungarian parties rank among the ethnoregional organizations in Central and Eastern Europe? What are the differences in the main goals of Hungarian ethnoregional parties operating in different countries?
- 2) How does the shrinking of Hungarian communities affect representation? What other factors influence electoral success? What are the territorial patterns behind all this?
- 3) Based on the above, what future trends can be outlined for Hungarian communities and Hungarian ethnoregional parties?

## METHODS

The study presents the characteristics of Hungarian ethnoregional parties in neighbouring countries within the Carpathian Basin. To this end, it is worth first examining the characteristics and changes of the communities that form the social and electoral base of these parties, as their size and social proportion are also important factors in terms of the political representation of Hungarian ethnic communities (as is the case with all ethnic groups). This is particularly true because if certain trends predicted in population forecasts come to pass, we may reach a critical point beyond which participation in representative bodies, especially at the national level, becomes highly questionable. The public databases of censuses conducted after the transition to democracy help characterize the main demographic processes of Hungarian ethnic communities, while population projections (Péti et al., 2021a) help outline the future trends.

In the next part of the study, our goal is to place Hungarian ethnoregional parties in a broader context (from a geographical and organizational point of view), and to this end, we also present the

## MAIN OBJECTIVES AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT OF HUNGARIAN PARTIES ABROAD

relevant results of our research focusing on Central and Eastern European ethnoregional parties (Baranyai, 2023; 2024). The main goal of the research was to develop a typology based on the party demands that occupy the highest place in the hierarchy. The hierarchy of typology uses a "state-oriented" approach, i.e., it evaluates individual aspirations from the perspective of the central government/state/majority society and ranks them according to the threat they pose to territorial integrity. To identify these goals, we conducted a qualitative content analysis of certain documents found on the organizations' websites (statutes, framework programs, election programs) that contain fundamental non-territorial and territorial demands. The resulting typology includes a total of 92 Central and Eastern European organizations, including 12 Hungarian ethnoregional parties.

Finally, in the last part of the study, we examine the social support and electoral success of three Hungarian ethnoregional parties that are suitable for detailed analysis, first based on national data (in Romania's case, this means the lower house) and then on regional data. We narrowed down the scope of the analysis to these three organizations because they are the main parties that usually field their own lists or candidates in national elections, their time series analysis covers roughly the same period, and their results, performance, and changes are truly reflected in the data. Other Hungarian ethnoregional parties run in parliamentary elections less frequently or for shorter periods, and sometimes as part of broad electoral coalitions, in which case it is impossible to determine their independent electoral support. The number of votes and vote share collected at the national level does not in itself reveal much about a party's support – although it does reveal the most important thing: whether it has a large enough social base to gain representation. However, it does not reveal much about how many voters within a given community – in our case, Hungarians living in neighboring states – it can reach, mobilize, and encourage to participate in elections and support the party. To get closer to this information, we use the mobilization index elaborated by Strijbis and Kotnarowski (2013), which is relatively simple but suitable for comparative and time series analysis.

$$\text{Mobilisation index} = \frac{\text{votes cast for ethnic party}}{\text{size of ethnic group} * \text{voter turnout}}$$

The index can take values between 0 and 1 – if the value exceeds this, it means that the party is able to gather votes outside the ethnic community, or that the ethnic community's participation in the election exceeded the general participation. For our calculations, we used primary sources, official, publicly available databases, working with relevant and appropriate regional census and election data. When calculating the index, we always used the results of the census closest to the given election as a basis. We limited our regional-level research to historical regions where significant Hungarian communities still live today, namely five districts in Slovakia, seven districts in Serbia, and sixteen counties in Romania.

### MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF HUNGARIAN COMMUNITIES ABROAD

A common feature of Hungarian communities living in neighbouring countries is that they did not emigrate voluntarily but became minorities because of the border changes (Kapitány, 2015) brought about by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. These Hungarian communities can be divided into three categories based on their similar characteristics. The Hungarian communities in Croatia and Slovenia are small groups living in areas close to the state border, and their numbers are steadily declining due to assimilation. As constitutionally recognized indigenous national communities, they have comprehensive individual and collective rights, including cultural autonomy and (one) guaranteed parliamentary seat. The Hungarian communities in Vojvodina and Transcarpathia are characterized by relatively large but declining populations, geographical compactness, and autonomous traditions, living on the border of multi-ethnic regions. Another common feature is that the territorial structure of their states is asymmetrical, and as a result, they have had bitter experiences (Kosovo, Crimea). The Romanian and Slovak communities are significant in number but declining, geographically more or less compact, and live in a relatively large area of the country. Another common feature is that, although they constitute the largest minority communities in their respective countries and represent a significant proportion of

the population, they only have individual rights and no constitutional or legal recognition. Furthermore, the administrative boundaries of the states do not follow ethnic boundaries.

The number of Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin is declining at an increasing rate (see Table 1, and this unfavourable, possibly irreversible trend is expected to continue in the coming period. Although Hungarians will remain dominant in the region, their proportion will decline somewhat in the future. In addition to the general aging process, assimilation processes (in Slovakia and Romania) and emigration (from Serbia, Ukraine, Romania) are also characteristic of Hungarians abroad, so population decline is expected to be more pronounced in these areas (Péti et al., 2021a). In many cases, emigration means migration to Hungary; so-called ethnocentric migration is very beneficial for the mother country due to the influx of mostly young, but at least working-age, skilled labour, but it further exacerbates the already unfavourable demographic conditions in the regions beyond the border (Péti et al., 2019; 2021b). According to population projections prepared for the entire Hungarian population in the Carpathian Basin, by 2051, a decline in the number of communities abroad is predicted, with the most serious impact on social proportions in Slovakia (by 2–2.5 percentage points), more moderately in Romania (by 1.5–2 percentage points in the worst-case scenario) and Serbia (by 0.5–1 percentage points). The numerical decline of Hungarians in neighbouring states will also be accompanied by a decrease in their proportion within the given society, which will also affect the individual regions to varying degrees, but even for Székely Land, which currently has a Hungarian majority, it may pose a challenge to maintain the ethnic dominance (Péti et al., 2021a).

**Table 1.** *The size of Hungarian communities and their proportion within the population according to censuses between 1991 and 2022*

	1991		2001/2002		2011		2021/2022	
	number	ratio	number	ratio	number	ratio	number	ratio
Croatia	22 355	0.5	16 595	0.4	14 048	0.3	10 315	0.27
Romania	1 624 959	7.1	1 431 807	6.6	1 227 623	6.1	1 002 151	5.3
Serbia	343 942	3.5	254 544	4.0	253 899	3.5	184 442	2.8
Slovakia	567 296	10.8	520 528	9.7	458 467	8.5	456 154	8.4
Slovenia	8 503	0.4	6 243	0.3				
Ukraine			156 566	0.3				

Source: own compilation based on census data

Notes: Serbia and Slovenia held censuses in 2002, Romania and Serbia in 2022. Ukraine has held only one census since the regime change. Slovenia has been conducting register-based censuses since 2011 and does not publish data on nationality/ethnicity.

Regulations concerning the political participation of Hungarian communities also vary. As already mentioned, the Hungarian communities in Croatia and Slovenia as constitutionally recognized indigenous nationalities have (one) guaranteed parliamentary seat (Ördögh, 2016). In contrast, Slovakia and Ukraine have electoral laws that do not support the national representation of minority communities in any way. In Serbia, national minorities have had electoral privileges since 2004, which means that they are exempt from the electoral threshold (previously 5%, currently 3%) and can instead obtain parliamentary representation based on a so-called natural threshold (Horváth, 2020). In Romania, the Hungarian community has always been able to enter the lower house of parliament on its own merits, i.e., according to the general rules, but if this were not possible for some reason, it would still be entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives based on the alternative threshold.

### MAIN OBJECTIVES OF HUNGARIAN ETHNOREGIONAL PARTIES

Based on their social and territorial characteristics and historical traditions, legal frameworks, all of which were discussed in the previous chapter, ethnoregional communities can formulate different objectives that can form the basis of their typology. As already mentioned in the theoretical chapter, several scholars have dealt with the classification of ethnoregional organizations into categories

according to their main objectives. We have previously attempted to classify as many Central and Eastern European parties as possible (Baranyai, 2023; 2024) by adapting Dandoy's (2010) typology elaborated to Western European organisations.

According to the results, the most ethnoregional parties in CEE are protectionist (53) and, within this category, conservative (44). The communities represented by these parties generally enjoy legal status and well-defined individual and/or collective rights, but they naturally aim to preserve and expand these rights – usually in language use and identity preservation – as much as possible. Ethnoregional communities, represented by another type of protectionist organization, the participatory parties (9), generally still have seats in one representative body or another, but they would like to change this to some extent through electoral reform. Decentralist parties strive to achieve a certain degree of territorial self-government within the existing state framework. The differences between the goals of these organizations are primarily determined by the historical traditions and territorial structure of the given state. The exclusively decentralist parties (11) do not want to radically change the state system, although most of them are dissatisfied with the existing territorial structure. They are pushing for territorial reform, changes to internal borders, and, within this new framework, greater territorial autonomy. Regionalist parties (12) want to create a more stable and less changeable territorial structure by securing the constitutional status of territorial units. Some of these parties want to reorganize the state based on natural, historical, economic, and cultural boundaries, while others support regionalization as a kind of modernization reform (see the EU and its regional policy). In contrast to regionalist parties, autonomist parties (9) focus exclusively on establishing constitutional status for their own region. Some parties demand autonomy for historical regions that previously enjoyed special status, while others plan to create smaller, self-governing territorial units within larger, multiethnic regions (some of which already enjoy autonomy). There are few federalist parties (7) in Central and Eastern Europe. Federal experiments in the region have ended in failure, and the future of the only state currently organized on federal principles is uncertain. However, some parties hope that the federal structure will resolve conflicts within states and bring about historical justice. Declared separatist parties (1) are rare in the region, as the formation of new nation states has largely eliminated these demands in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, it is also true that the new state borders have given rise to new discontent, so it is likely that many more parties harbor separatist hopes than those that express them in their documents (they cannot do so because it would be considered unconstitutional).

Hungarian communities also differ significantly from one another, as we saw in the previous chapter. It is no wonder that they are found in different places in the typology. Moreover, although ethnic minority status requires unity from a power-technical point of view, the members of an ethnic or ethnoregional community within a given state are divided in their ideas and goals. Social communities, including minority communities, are always heterogeneous, and political pluralism develops just as naturally within organizations that have become political actors. Participation in government in particular leads directly to fragmentation (Szöcsik – Bochsler, 2013) and ultimately to the split of parties.

Below, we present where Hungarian ethnoregional parties are positioned in the typology based on their documents. In Slovenia, individual candidates rather than political organizations compete for the parliamentary seats allocated to the Hungarian community in the majority constituencies. The main goal of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Croatia (*Horvátországi Magyarok Demokratikus Közössége*) is “the comprehensive representation of the interests of the Hungarian national community in Croatia” (DUHC, 2010). Without territorial goals, the organization can be classified as protectionist and, within that, as a conservative party. In recent years, Hungarian parties – including the Hungarian Fórum (*Magyar Fórum*) and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Alliance (*Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Szövetség*) in Slovakia have all been regionalist. The organization currently known as the Hungarian Alliance (*Magyar Szövetség*) previously summarized the territorial demands of the organizations that formed the party in its program: “We urge the reorganization of Slovakia’s administrative divisions, taking into account natural economic, geographical, and historical regions” (Alliance, 2021). The creation of territorial units corresponding to historical and ethnic boundaries has been a demand and common feature of Hungarian organizations since the change of regime (which has been unsuccessful considering the 1996 administrative law). The Hungarian People's Party of

Transylvania (*Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt*) and the Hungarian Civic Party (*Magyar Polgári Párt*) propose a completely different approach, asymmetric regionalization, a kind of European modernization reform as the basis for Romania's reorganization: "The foundation of the new Romania: solidarity between constitutional regions (...) Reform of public administration: asymmetric regionalism" (HPPT, 2012), and similarly: "deepening the autonomy of individual regions, which is embodied in separate powers (...) within the framework of asymmetric regionalism" (HCP, 2008). In 2022, after lengthy discussions, the two organizations finally merged into a single party (Hungarian Alliance of Transylvania, *Erdélyi Magyar Szövetség*). The details of their territorial concepts differ, and in the absence of an accessible program, the compromise solution has not yet been clarified, although it is likely that the regionalist character will remain. When formulating its demands for autonomy, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (*Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség*) focuses on the Székely Land. The party has abandoned its radical demands and cautiously formulates its goals: it wishes to achieve various "forms of autonomy, including territorial autonomy." In doing so, it supports general decentralization and the application of the principle of subsidiarity (DAHR, 2018). Within the framework of multi-level autonomy, parties fighting for the creation of smaller, municipal territorial units are active in Vojvodina, Serbia, and Transcarpathia. The Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (*Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség*) urges that "in the already autonomous province of Vojvodina, Hungarian-majority municipalities and Hungarian-majority settlements bordering them (...) should establish a Hungarian regional municipality (...)" (AVH, 2004). According to the Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians (*Vajdasági Magyarok Demokratikus Közössége*) "only effective and comprehensive Hungarian autonomy in the southern region can guarantee the survival and further development of the Hungarian community living in the southern region" (DFVH, 2017). The Hungarian Movement (*Magyar Mozgalom*) in Serbia takes a more moderate view than others, calling for "broad autonomy for the province of Vojvodina and local governments" (HM, 2017). The Ukrainian Hungarian Democratic Alliance in Ukraine (*Ukrajnai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség*) considers "the creation of a Hungarian district covering the majority of settlements with a Hungarian population (...) to be a goal to be achieved in the course of the administrative and local government reforms taking place in Ukraine" (HDAU, 2021). The only Hungarian party that adopted a federalist approach was another Hungarian organization operating in Transcarpathia, the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association (*Kárpátaljai Magyar Kulturális Szövetség*), which saw the solution in a federal state, "given Ukraine's multi-ethnic composition and the fact that the country has several historically distinct regions." (THCA, w.y.).

## ELECTORAL SUPPORT OF HUNGARIAN ETHNOREGIONAL PARTIES

### Electoral support at national level

The Party of the Hungarian Coalition (PHC, *Magyar Koalíció Pártja*) was formed by the merger of three organizations to successfully participate in the 1998 elections held under the new electoral law (Ördögh, 2016). Initially (1998–2006), the PHC was able to mobilize a significant portion of the Hungarian community and gather Hungarian votes. In these years the mobilization index was relatively close or even above to 1 (Table 2). Between 1998 and 2010, the party easily crossed the parliamentary election threshold, but its position in government increased the already existing internal tensions, leading to the slow erosion of the party and a decline in its support. The biggest blow came after the split in 2009 with the formation of Bridge (Most-Híd) and its successful participation in the subsequent elections. As a result, the PHC failed to enter parliament in 2010, and later, when supporters of the multi-ethnic Bridge began to turn away, it was unable to win back Hungarian voters (Harrach, 2017). Since 2010, the party's support base, as the mobilisation index clearly shows, has shrunk significantly. In 2020 and 2023, the number of votes cast for Hungarian organizations participating in various electoral and party coalitions – Hungarian Community Togetherness, later the Alliance – increased only slightly. However, the current voter base is narrow, and it appears that regaining parliamentary representation would require the support of almost the entire Hungarian community.

In Romania, the DAHR has been the dominant party of the Hungarian community after the regime change, which means that it usually wins all Hungarian votes in parliamentary elections, although due to internal conflicts within the organisation in the early days (Szász, 2006) and later it

## MAIN OBJECTIVES AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT OF HUNGARIAN PARTIES ABROAD

faced Hungarian challengers on several occasions. However, unlike in Slovakia, rival parties have been unable to break the DAHR's dominance, although it is true that the HCP did never run in the parliamentary elections, and HPPT only tested itself in the 2012 elections (Ördögh, 2016). In the meantime (2022), these two smaller parties have merged under the name Hungarian Alliance of Transylvania and are focusing on local politics. They are not fielding candidates in national (and European) elections but are supporting the DAHR. If they really do so, DAHR will only have to focus on mobilizing the Hungarian community during election campaigns. According to the mobilisation index, it can be concluded that DAHR is indeed capable of winning the votes of almost the entire Hungarian community (Table 3). The 2012 election year clearly stands out from the DAHR's time series results, as the 47,955 votes collected by the HPPT caused a significant loss (a decrease in the number and proportion of votes and the number of seats won, with a visible break in the curve of the mobilization index), seriously jeopardizing the representation.

**Table 2.** *National electoral results of Party of the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia*

Election year	Number of votes	Percentage of votes	Number of mandates	Turnout	Mobilization index
1998	306 623	9.13	15	84.24	0.70
2002	321 069	11.17	20	70.06	0.88
2006	269 111	11.68	20	54.67	1.07
2010	109 638	4.33	0	58.83	0.41
2012	109 483	4.29	0	59.11	0.40
2016*	105 495	4.05	0	59.38	0.38
2020**	112 662	3.91	0	65.75	0.38
2023***	130 183	4.39	0	68.42	0.42

Source: own compilation based on census and electoral data

Coalitions \*Party of the Hungarian Community, \*\*Hungarian Community Togetherness, \*\*\*Alliance

Highest values in the mobilisation index can be recorded in the last election years (see Table 4), when the turnout of the Hungarian community voting for the DAHR presumably exceeds the national average (Bodó, 2017 states this with certainty for 2016). In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in record low turnout, and although the number of votes cast for the Hungarian party was the lowest ever this year, mobilization was probably more successful than the Romanian average. In 2024, Romania's super election year (with European Parliament, local, parliamentary, and presidential elections), public life was extremely politicized and mobilized, and it was clearly most effective among Hungarian voters.

**Table 3.** *National electoral results of Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania*

Election year	Number of votes	Percentage of votes	Number of mandates	Turnout	Mobilization index
1990	991 601	7,23	29	86,19	0,71
1992	809 653	7,48	27	76,29	0,65
1996	812 628	6,64	25	76,01	0,66
2000	736 863	6,80	27	65,31	0,79
2004	628 125	6,17	22	58,51	0,75
2008	425 008	6,17	22	39,20	0,88
2012	380 656	5,14	18	41,76	0,74
2016	435 969	6,19	21	39,49	0,90
2020	339 030	5,74	21	31,90	1,06
2024	585 397	6,33	22	52,50	1,11

Source: own compilation based on census and electoral data

In Serbia, the history of the AVH differs from that of the PHC in Slovakia and the DAHR in Romania, as it is not a grassroots organization but one that emerged from an earlier formation. In the period after 1990, the AVH broke away from the DFVH, which represented the Hungarian community, in 1994 (Ördögh, 2016), and in the 1997 elections, it took over the leading role from the party within the Hungarian community (Table 4). Since then, it has maintained this position against the rival parties that have been forming one after another (Hungarian Movement, Hungarian Civic Alliance, Hungarian Hope Movement). Parties in Vojvodina often participate in interethnic electoral coalitions, which is why the competition for Hungarian votes is less obvious and clear-cut based on the election results. The history of the AVH's development is clearly visible in the changes in its support indicators, as the party has made significant progress compared to its initial narrow support base. The COVID-19 pandemic and the boycott announced by the opposition (Molnár, 2021) resulted in low voter turnout in 2020, which was one of the factors contributing to the AVH's outstanding electoral success; the support indicator value is most favourable during this period. However, due to the higher turnout, all indicators decreased and returned to previous levels starting from the 2022 election year, so the 2020 result can be considered a one-off spike.

**Table 3.** *National electoral results of Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania*

Election year	Number of votes	Percentage of votes	Number of mandates	Turnout	Mobilization index
1997	50 960	1.28	4	57.37	0.35
2000*	2 404 758	65.69	176	57.64	-
2003**	161 765	4.29	0	58.75	-
2007	52 510	1.32	3	60.62	0.34
2008***	74 874	1.85	4	61.35	0.48
2012	68 323	1.83	5	46.28	0.58
2014	75 294	2.17	6	53.09	0.56
2016****	56 620	1.54	4	56.07	0.40
2020	71 893	2.32	9	48.93	0.80
2022	60 313	1.63	5	58.60	0.56
2023	64 747	1.74	6	58.77	0.60


Source: own compilation based on census and electoral data

Coalitions: \*Democratic Opposition of Serbia, \*\*Together for Tolerance, \*\*\*Hungarian Coalition, \*\*\*\*Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians – Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians

### **Electoral support at regional level**

The overmentioned doubling of the number of Hungarian parties in Slovakia has also brought about significant changes at the regional level. The proportion of the Hungarian community successfully mobilized by the PHC fell to less than half of the 2006 level in all regions with a Hungarian population, with the most drastic change occurring in the Bratislava district, which includes the capital. A review of the time series results for each region also shows that the effectiveness of mobilization (Figure 1) has not improved significantly since then, with no region able to catch up, let alone approach the 2006 figures. While there has been a slight improvement and more effective mobilization in the Trnava and Bratislava districts, stagnation can be observed in the Nitra and Košice districts, and a gradual and continuous decline in the Banská Bystrica district. This is in line with Harrach's (2017) finding that the PHC was unable to take advantage of Bridge's declining support and win back voters, except in the western part of the country, specifically in the districts of Senec, Galanta, and Dunajská Streda, where there was a moderate improvement. In the Bratislava district – unsurprisingly, since liberal (or more liberal) groups tend to be concentrated in capital cities and large cities, which also form the base of multi-ethnic parties – the PHC's support relative to the proportion of the Hungarian population plummeted in the first election year, and although the indicator has improved somewhat over the years, no real recovery is expected in this region. The positive impact of the 2023 coalition, which was also

the last hope for winning back and mobilizing voters, can be felt everywhere at the regional level outside Bratislava district, but it has failed to bring about any breakthrough changes anywhere.




**Figure 1.** *Regional electoral results of Party of the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia*

Source: own compilation based on census and electoral data

Note: In the figure, territorial units are marked with ISO-3166 codes

The mobilization of Transylvanian counties reflects national participation trends, with changes between individual years pointing in the same direction in all territorial units. Despite this apparent regional balance, there are significant and persistent differences between individual counties. The persistence of these differences is confirmed by analyses of earlier periods (Kiss, 2009; Székely, n.d.), and we can make very similar observations today, which can be explained largely—but not necessarily—by changes in the proportion of the Hungarian population in each county, its territorial concentration, and its attitude toward mobilization. In terms of mobilization (Figure 5) Szilágy County stands out among the Transylvanian regions during the period under review, but we also see consistently high values in Szatmár, Maros, Hargita, and Bihar Counties—that is, as Székely (n.d.) puts it, in Székely Land and the so-called contact counties. Mobilization was least effective in the counties located in the southern part of Transylvania, with particularly low values in Timis County, but Fehér and Nagyszeben counties can also be classified in this group. In 2024, in addition to the traditionally strong performing regions, mobilization was most successful in Caras-Severin County, probably well above the Romanian average. It is important to note that very few ethnic Hungarians live here, so the number of voters is low, and the index value is also influenced by the fact that the last time so many people voted for DAHR in this county was in 2008.




**Figure 2.** *Regional electoral results of Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania*

Source: own compilation based on census and electoral data

Note: In the figure, territorial units are marked with ISO-3166 codes

The time series mobilization indicators for the districts of Vojvodina (Figure 3) give cause for optimism. On the one hand, in the areas with the largest Hungarian populations – the districts of North Bačka, North Banat, and West Bačka – the AVH’s mobilization index was balanced and outstanding in 2020, which means that the effectively mobilizable voter base is stable. On the other hand, the party has also activated and mobilized the Hungarian community elsewhere. Previously, the AVH did not even field candidates in the diaspora areas, but after the reform of the electoral system, it opened up in this direction as well and managed to mobilize the inhabitants of the southern part of the country, who were previously considered the base of the DFPVH and the Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians (DPVH, *Vajdasági Magyar Demokrata Párt*) (Léphaft, 2021), as illustrated by the sudden change in the indicator and the catching up of values in other areas inhabited by Hungarians.



**Figure 3.** *Regional electoral results of Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians in Serbia*

Source: own compilation based on census and electoral data

Note: In the figure, territorial units are marked with ISO-3166 codes RS-01 – North Bačka; RS-02 – Central Banat; RS-03 – North Banat; RS-04 – South Banat; RS-05 – West Bačka; RS-06 – South Bačka; RS-07 – Srem

### CONCLUSION(S)

Considering the situation of Hungarian ethnic communities in neighbouring states, it can be said that main demands formulated by the organisations representing them are not excessive. Hungarian ethnoregional parties can mostly be classified as decentralist, in line with the size of the communities they represent and their high territorial concentration in the given region. However, whether this is sufficient for success is another question. In this part of Europe, “soft” territorial demands (i.e. those that do not violate state borders) are unlikely to be met later if no progress has been made in this area so far, e.g. during regime change, administrative reforms or accession to the European Union.

It seems that ethnic politics has no future in Slovakia. This may have been indicated already by the fact that a significant part of Hungarians voted for the multiethnic Bridge party, and later did not return to the PHC (or Cooperation, Alliance) (Harrach, 2017), but rather likely support majority parties (Rákóczi, 2020). In Romania, the agreement between the parties, which was established in the interest of the coordinated representation of the public affairs of Hungarians in Transylvania, ensures that the Hungarian voting base is kept together. If the current balance and political strategy exist, the DAHR’s own parliamentary participation is not threatened by external factors, its social support is sufficiently stable, and its mobilizing power is also high enough to exceed the five percent threshold in the future. The development of the electoral support of the AVH is a good example of the effect of changing the electoral system, as it was the basis for its expansion towards the southern Voivodeship districts. Although it is unlikely to be able to repeat the outstanding success of the 2020 election held under exceptional circumstances, there may still be territorial reserves and social strata that can be mobilized. The regional results confirm how decisive the spatial location and concentration of the Hungarian community is. In ethnically relative compact regions – in the northern part of Vojvodina, in Székelyland, and in the north-western areas of Transylvania with significant Hungarian communities – Hungarian parties can count on the highest proportion of Hungarian votes. This is also true – to a much lesser extent – for the Slovak regions, although a district-level analysis there could present this much more clearly.

As we have seen, according to the censuses, the number of Hungarians living in neighbouring states is continuously decreasing, and this trend is expected to continue in the future. It is a cause for concern that the results of the censuses held in the early 2020s are already below the values estimated for 2021 of the most unfavourable scenarios of population projections (Péti et al, 2021a). All this means that if the population decline continues at the current rate, by 2051 the situation of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin could be significantly worse than the published projections. Gaining broad support from the Hungarian community is an important but not sufficient condition for parties to participate in parliament; this requires a critical mass capable of representation in the given electoral system. If the rules of the current electoral systems remain unchanged, ethnic politics and representation in Slovakia will certainly end in its classic form. In Romania and Serbia, due to the alternative thresholds, the representation of the Hungarian community may remain resolved in the long term despite the significant population decline, but the role of the parties in the political and party system may be significantly marginalized.

### REFERENCES

- BARANYAI, N. (2023). *A kelet-közép-európai etnoregionális pártok tipológiája* [Typology of ethnoregional parties in Central and Eastern Europe], *Politikatudományi Szemle*, vol 32, no. 3, pp. 81–104.
- BARANYAI, N. (2024). *Non-Territorial and Territorial Objectives of Central and Eastern European Ethnoregional Parties*, *Journal of Urban and Regional Analysis*, vol 16, no. 1, pp. 23–58, <https://doi.org/10.37043/JURA.2024.16.1.2>
- BERNAUER, J., BOCHSLER, D. (2011). *Electoral Entry and Success of Ethnic Minority Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: A Hierarchical Selection Model*, *Electoral Studies*, vol 30, no. 4, pp. 738–755. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.07.001>

- BOCHSLER, D. (2006). *Electoral Engineering and Inclusion of Ethnic Groups. Ethnic Minorities in Parliaments of Central and Eastern European Countries*, in SSEES Postgraduate Conference, London.
- BOCHSLER, D. (2011). *It is not how many votes you get, but also where you get them. Territorial determinants and institutional hurdles for the success of ethnic minority parties in post-communist countries*, *Acta Politica*, vol 46, no. 3, pp. 217–238. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2010.26>
- BODÓ, B. (2017). *Sikert sikerre: parlamenti választások Romániában, 2016* [Success after success: parliamentary elections in Romania, 2016], *Kisebbségkutatás*, vol 26, no 1., pp. 58–80.
- BUGAJSKI, J. (1995). *Ethnic politics in Eastern Europe. A guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations and Parties*, M. E. Sharpe, New York – London.
- CHANDRA, K. (2005). *Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability*, *Perspectives on Politics*, vol 3. no. 3, pp. 235–252. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705050188>
- CHANDRA, K. (2011). *What is an ethnic party?* *Party Politics*, vol 17, no. 2, pp. 151–169. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810391153>
- CHANDRA, K., METZ, D. (2002). *A New Cross-National Database on Ethnic Parties*, Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- COACKLEY, J. (2003). *Introduction. The challenge*, in Coackley J. (ed), *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*, Frank Cass, London, pp. 1–22.
- COX, G. W. (1987). *Electoral equilibrium under alternative voting institutions*. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol 31, pp. 82–108. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111325>
- DANDOY, R. (2010). *Ethno-regionalist parties in Europe: a typology*, *Perspectives on Federalism*, vol 2, no. 2, pp. 194–220.
- DE WINTER, L. (1998). *Conclusion. A Comparative Analysis of the Electoral, Office and Policy Success of Ethnoregionalist Parties*, in De Winter, L., Türsan, H. (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*, Routledge–ECPR Studies in European Political Science, London–New York, pp. 204–247. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203169391>
- DE WINTER, L. (2001). *The Impact of European Integration on Ethnoregionalist Parties*, Working Paper n°195. Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Barcelona.
- DE WINTER, L., GÓMEZ-REINO, M. (2002). *European Integration and Ethnoregionalist Parties*. *Party Politics*, vol 8, no. 4, pp. 483–503.
- DOBOS, B. (2013). *Roma political parties in Hungary after 1989*, in Dácz, E. (ed), *Minderheitenfragen in Ungarn und in den Nachbarländern im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert (Minority issues in Hungary and neighbouring countries in the 20th and 21st centuries)*, *Nomos*, Baden-Baden, pp. 279–291. <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845249438>
- GHERGHINA, S. (2014). *Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe. Enhancing Voter Loyalty*. Routledge, London. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315752716>
- GOMBÁR, CS. (1994). *Társadalomszemléletünk etnicizálódása* [The ethnicization of our social view], *Politikatudományi Szemle*, vol 3, no. 4., pp. 78–115.
- GÓMEZ-REINO CACHAFEIRO, M., DE WINTER, L., LYNCH, P. (2006). *Conclusion: The Future Study of Autonomist and Regionalist Parties*, in De Winter, L., Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M., Lynch, P. (eds), *Autonomist parties in Europe*, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Barcelona, pp. 247–270.
- GUNTHER, R., DIAMOND, L. (2003). *Species of Political Parties. A New Typology*, *Party Politics*, vol 9, no. 2, pp. 167–199. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688030092003>
- HARRACH, G. (2016). *Etnicitás és pártpreferencia a Felvidéken – Kik alkotják az MKP és a Most–Híd szavazótáborát?* [Ethnicity and party preference in South Slovakia – Who makes up the MKP and Most–Híd voting camp?], *Kisebbségi Szemle*, vol 1, no. 2, pp. 29–52.
- HARRACH, G. (2017). *Szavazói átjárás az MKP és a Most–Híd között* [Voter passage between MKP and Most–Híd], *Kisebbségi Szemle*, vol 2, no. 1, pp. 59–78.
- HOROWITZ, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.

- HORVÁTH, L. (2020). *A parlamenti választási rendszerek nemzeti kisebbségi vonatkozásai a Nyugat-Balkánon – Harminc éve a demokrácia árnyékában?* [National Minority Aspects of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in the Western Balkans – Thirty Years in the Shadow of Democracy?], *Kisebbségi Szemle*, vol 4, no. 2, pp. 7–35.
- ILLYÉS, G. (2021). *Parlamenti választások Romániában – Ellenzéki pozíciót ért a baloldal meglepetésszerű győzelme* [Parliamentary elections in Romania – The left's surprise victory has put the opposition in a position], *Kisebbségi Szemle*, vol 6. no. 2, pp. 7–28.
- ILLYÉS, G., SZÉKELY, I. G. (2017). *Parlamenti választások Romániában – Stabil baloldali többség, megosztott ellenzék* [Parliamentary elections in Romania – Stable left-wing majority, divided opposition], *Kisebbségi Szemle*, vol 2, no 1, pp. 35–58.
- ISHIYAMA, J. (2000). *Institutions and ethno-political conflict in postcommunist politics*, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* vol 6, no. 3, pp. 51–67. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110008428603>
- ISHIYAMA, J. (2006). *Globalization, political institutions and ethnic assertiveness: an empirical study of thirty-two developing countries*, *Ethnopolitics*, vol 5, no 2, pp. 167–182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449050600655193>
- ISHIYAMA, J., BREUNING, M. (1998). *Ethnopolitics in the New Europe*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685851736>
- ISHIYAMA, J., STEWART, B. (2019). *Organization and the Structure of Opportunities: Understanding the Success of Ethnic Parties in Postcommunist Europe*, *Party Politics*, vol 27. no 1, pp. 69–80. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068819864089>
- JENNE E. K. (2007). *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
- JIGLAU, G., GHERGHINA, S. (2011). *The divergent paths of the ethnic parties in post-communist transitions*, *Transition Studies Review*, vol 18, no. 2, pp. 445–457. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11300-011-0212-4>
- KAPITÁNY, B. (2015). *Külhoni magyar közösségek* [Hungarian communities abroad], in Monostori, J., Őri, P., Spéder, Zs. (eds.), *Demográfiai portré 2015* [Demographic portrait 2015], KSH NKI, Budapest, pp. 227–240.
- KEATING, M. (1996). *Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland*. Palgrave Macmillan, London. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374348>
- KISS, T. (2009). *Az RMDSZ és az erdélyi magyar választók. Szociológiai vázlat* [The DAHR and the Hungarian voters in Transylvania. A sociological sketch], *Pro Minoritate*, vol 18, no 1, pp. 34–57.
- KISS, T., BARNA, G., SZÉKELY, I. G. (2013). *A társadalomépítéstől a klientúra-építésig. Az RMDSZ és a magyar választók közötti kapcsolódás átalakulása* [From society building to clientelism. The transformation of the connection between the DAHR and the Hungarian electorate], *Magyar Kisebbség*, vol 18 no. 2, pp. 7–40.
- KISS, T., BARNA, G., SZÉKELY, I. G. (2018). *Az erdélyi magyarok választói viselkedése 1999 és 2014 között* [Voting behavior of Transylvanian Hungarians between 1999 and 2014], in Fedinec, Cs., Szarka, L., Vizi, B. (eds.), [Ethnic parties in Central and Eastern Europe, 1989–2014], MTA TK Kisebbségkutató Intézet, MTA BTK Történettudományi Intézet, Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, pp. 150–201.
- KOEV, D (2014). *The determinants of ethnic minority party formation and success in Europe*, Unpublished Dissertation. Urbana Champaign, University of Illinois
- KOEV, D (2019). *Why Ethnic Parties? A New Theory of Ethnic Minority Political Strategy in Europe*, *Nations and Nationalism*, vol 25, no. 1, pp. 229–297. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12462>
- KOEV, D. (2021). *Ethnic minority party formation and success in Europe*, *East European Politics*, vol 38. no. 1, pp. 83–100. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2021.1895116>
- KOSTADINOVA, T. (2002). *Do mixed electoral systems matter?: a cross-national analysis of their effects in Eastern Europe*, *Electoral Studies*, vol 21, no. 1, pp. 23–34.

- LÉPHAFT, Á. (2014). *Parlamenti választások és magyar választói mobilizáció a vajdasági magyar többségű községekben* [Parliamentary elections and Hungarian voter mobilization in Hungarian-majority municipalities in Vojvodina], in Reményi, P. (ed.), *Állam- és nemzetépítés a Nyugat-Balkánon* [State and nation building in the Western Balkans], IDRResearch Kft., Publikon, Pécs, pp. 63–78.
- LÉPHAFT, Á. (2021). *Választási mérnökösködés és magyar érdekképviselet Szerbiában (1990–2000)* [Election engineering and Hungarian advocacy in Serbia (1990–2000)], *Kisebbségi Szemle*, vol 6, no. 3, pp. 73–111.
- LUBLIN, D. (2014). *Minority Rules: Electoral Systems, Decentralization, and Ethnoregional Party Success*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199948826.001.0001>
- MIKESELL, M., MURPHY, A. (1991). *A Framework for Comparative Study of Minority-Group Aspirations*, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, vol 81, no. 4, pp. 581–604. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.1991.tb01710.x>
- MOLNÁR, CS. (2021). *Választások a járvány idején: Parlamenti, tartományi és helyi önkormányzati választások Szerbiában* [Elections during the pandemic: Parliamentary, provincial and local elections in Serbia], *Kisebbségi Szemle*, vol 6, no. 1, pp. 73–96.
- MUDDE, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037>
- MÜLLER-ROMMEL, F. (1998). *Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe. Theoretical Considerations and Framework of Analysis*, in De Winter, L., Türsan, H. (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*, Routledge–ECPR Studies in European Political Science, London–New York, pp. 17–27. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203169391>
- NAKAI, R. (2012). *The Success and Failure of Ethnic Parties in New Democracies: Cross-National and Intertemporal Analysis of Post-Communist Europe*, in: World Congress of International Political Science Association, International Political Science Association, Santiago.
- NEDELCO, H., DEBARDELEBEN, J. (2016). *Conceptualizing Party Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe*, *East European Politics and Societies*, vol 30, no. 2, pp. 381–403. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325415599192>
- ÖRDÖGH, T. (2016). *Divide et impera: A határon túli magyar pártok megosztottsága* [Divide et impera: The division of Hungarian parties across the border], in Garaczi I. (ed.), *A fenntarthatóság perspektívái a Kárpát-medencében. Multidiszciplináris vizsgálatok* [Perspectives of sustainability in the Carpathian Basin. Multidisciplinary studies], Veszprémi Humán Tudományokért Alapítvány, Veszprém, pp. 301–319.
- PAP, A. L. (1999). *Az etnicitás, mint a politikai képviselet alapja* [Ethnicity as the basis of political representation], *Politikatudományi Szemle*, vol 8, no. 4., pp. 22–48.
- PÉTI, M., PAKOT, L., MEGYESI, Z., SZABÓ, B. (2021a). *A Kárpát-medencei magyarság népesség-előreszámítása, 2011–2051.* [Population projection of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin, 2011–2051.], in: *Annales 2020*, Nemzetstratégiai Kutatóintézet, Budapest, pp. 64–96. <https://doi.org/10.21543/Dem.63.4.1>
- PÉTI, M., SZABÓ, B., SCHWARCZ, GY., CSÉCSI, D. (2019). *A szomszédos országokból Magyarországra áttelepült népesség demográfiai es gazdasági hatásai, területi mintázata* [Demographic and economic effects and territorial pattern of the population that migrated to Hungary from neighboring countries], *Annales 2018*, Nemzetstratégiai Kutatóintézet, Budapest, pp. 163–172.
- PÉTI, M., SZABÓ, L., OBÁDOVICS, CS., SZABÓ, B., CSÉCSI, D. (2021b). *Analyzing Ethnocentric Immigration through the Case of Hungary – Demographic Effects of Immigration from Neighboring Countries to Hungary.* *Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies*, vol 8, no. 4, pp. 128–153. <https://doi.org/10.29333/ejecs/857>
- RÁKÓCZI, K. (2020). *Parlamenti választások Szlovákiában – képviselet nélkül maradtak a magyarok* [Parliamentary elections in Slovakia – Hungarians were left without representation], *Kisebbségi Szemle*, vol 5, no. 1, pp. 67–86.

- RAVASZ, Á. (2013). *Szlovákiai magyarok mint választók, 2009–2013*. [Hungarians in Slovakia as voters, 2009–2013.], *Magyar Kisebbség*, vol 18, no. 2, pp. 41–68.
- ROKKAN, S., URWIN, D. (1982). *Introduction: Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe*, in Rokkan, S., Urwin, D. (eds.), *The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism*, Sage, London, pp. 425–436.
- RUDOLPH, J., THOMPSON, R. (1989). *Pathways to Accommodation and the Persistence of the Ethnoterritorial Challenge in Western Democracies*, in Rudolph, J., Thompson, R. (szerk.), *Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy, and the Western World*, Lynne Rienner, London, pp. 221–240.
- SALAT L., SZÉKELY, I. G. (2018). *Az etnikai párt fogalma* [The concept of ethnic party], in: Fedinec, Cs., Szarka, L., Vizi, B. (eds.), *Etnikai pártok Kelet-Közép-Európában, 1989–2014*. [Ethnic parties in Central and Eastern Europe, 1989–2014], MTA TK Kisebbségkutató Intézet, MTA BTK Történettudományi Intézet, Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, pp. 25–78.
- SEILER, D-L. (1985). *De la classification des partis politiques* [On the classification of political parties], *Res Publica*, vol 27, no. 1, pp. 59–86. <https://doi.org/10.21825/rp.v27i1.20379>
- SNYDER, L. L. (1982). *Global Mini-Nationalisms. Autonomy and Independence*, Greenwood Press, London.
- STRIJBIS, O., KOTNAROWSKI, M. (2013). Measuring the electoral mobilization of ethnic parties: Towards comparable indicators, *Party Politics*, vol 21, no. 3, pp. 456–469. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068813487105>
- STRMISKA, M. (2003). *Conceptualization and typology of European regional parties: a note on methodology*, *Central European Political Studies Review*, vol 5, no. 2–3.
- STROSCHEIN, S. (2001). *Measuring Ethnic Party Success in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine*, *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol 48, no. 4, pp. 59–69. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2001.11655943>
- SZÁSZ, A. Z. (2006). *A magyar kisebbséget képviselő pártok választási sikeressége (1990–2004)* [Electoral success of parties representing the Hungarian minority (1990–2004)], *Erdélyi Múzeum*, vol 68, no. 1–2, pp. 14–52.
- SZÉKELY, I. G. (n.d.). *Választási eredmények. Etnikai szavazás, etnikai pártok* [Election results. Ethnic voting, ethnic parties] <https://lexikon.adatbank.ro/mobil/tarsadalomismeret/szocikk.php?id=25>
- SZÉKELY, I. G., HORVÁTH, I. (2014). *Diversity recognition and minority representation in Central and Southeast Europe: a comparative analysis*, *Nationalities Papers*, vol 42, no. 3, pp. 426–448. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.916660>
- SZÖCSIK, E., BOCHSLER, D. (2013). *All Jointly or Everyone on its Own? On Fissions and Fusions of Ethnic Minority Parties*, in DANERO, J., STOJANOVIC, N., WEINBLUM, S. (eds.), *New Nation-States and National Minorities*, ECPR Press, Colchester, pp. 213–254.
- SZÖCSIK, E., ZUBER, C. I. (2015). *EPAC – A New Dataset on Ethnonationalism in Party Competition in 22 European Democracies*, *Party Politics*, vol 21, no. 1, pp. 153–160. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462927>
- URWIN, D. (1985). *Harbinger, Fossil or Flexible? "Regionalism" and the West European Party Mosaic*, in Daalder, H., Mair, P. (eds.), *Western European Party Systems. Continuity & Change*, Sage, Beverly Hills, pp. 221–256.
- WALLER, M. (1995). *Adaptation of the former communist parties of East Central Europe: A case of Democratization?* *Party Politics*, vol 1, no 4, pp. 373–390. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068895001004003>
- WOLFF, S. (2004). *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts*, in Schneckener, U., Wolff, S. (eds.), *Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa, and Asia*, Palgrave Macmillan. London, pp. 1–17.
- ZUBER, C. I. (2011). *Beyond outbidding? Ethnic party strategies in Serbia*, *Party Politics*, vol 19, no. 5, pp. 758–777. <https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068811410368>

ZUBER, C. I., SZÖCSIK, E. (2019). *The second edition of the EPAC expert survey on ethnonationalism in party competition – testing for validity and reliability*, Regional&Federal Studies, vol 29, no. 1, pp. 91–113. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2018.1512975>

### Other sources

Alliance 2021 <https://szovetseg.sk/alapveto-celkituzeseink> retrieved on 03.01.2023.  
AVH 2004 <https://www.vmsz.org.rs/o-nama/dokumentum/program> retrieved on 29.06.2021.  
DAHR 2017 <https://rmdsz.ro/upload/dokumentumok/RMDSZProgram2017.pdf> retrieved on 04.07.2017.  
DFVH 2017 <http://old1.vmdk.org.rs/hirek/657-a-vmdk-2017-junius-25-obecsei-kongresszusanak-zaronyilatkozata> retrieved on 03.07.2017.  
DUHC 2010 <https://hmdk.hr/rolunk/alapszabaly> retrieved on 04.04.2018.  
HCDA n.d. <http://mkdsz.sk/a-magyar-keresztenydemokrata-szovetseg-strategiai-celjai/> retrieved on 30.07.2021.  
HCP 2008  
[http://www.polgaripart.ro/index.php?option=com\\_rubberdoc&view=category&id=55%3Aprogram&Itemid=892](http://www.polgaripart.ro/index.php?option=com_rubberdoc&view=category&id=55%3Aprogram&Itemid=892) retrieved on 10.01.2019.  
HDAU 2021 <https://www.umdsz.com.ua/> retrieved on 23.05.2022.  
HM 2017 [http://www.magyarmozgalom.rs/hu/program\\_2/a-magyar-mozgalom-programja](http://www.magyarmozgalom.rs/hu/program_2/a-magyar-mozgalom-programja) retrieved on 04.04.2021.  
HPPT 2012 <https://neppart.eu/politikai-keretprogram/> retrieved on 04.07.2017.  
Hungarian Forum 2020 <https://magyarforum.sk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/V%C3%A1laszt%C3%A1si-program-2020.pdf> retrieved on 05.08.2021.  
THCA n.d. <http://www.karpatalja.com.ua/kmksz/program.html> retrieved on 11.02.2022.

### Databases

Croatia  
Državni zavod za statistiku <https://podaci.dzs.hr>

Romania  
Institutul Național de Statistică <https://insse.ro> (censuses)  
Autoritatea Electorală Permanentă <https://www.roaep.ro> (elections)

Serbia  
Republički zavod za statistiku Srbije  
<https://www.stat.gov.rs/sr-latn/oblasti/popis/> (censuses)  
<https://www.stat.gov.rs/sr-Latn/oblasti/izbori/> (elections)

Slovakia  
Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky  
<https://slovak.statistics.sk> (censuses)  
<https://volby.statistics.sk/> (elections)

Slovenia  
Statistični urad Republike Slovenije <https://www.stat.si/>

Ukraine  
Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy <https://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/>